refactor: 重构并优化项目多项功能

1. 调整CORS中间件挂载位置,重构CORS处理逻辑
2. 重写IP获取逻辑,增加私有网络IP信任校验
3. 优化日志中间件,移除/health接口单独日志逻辑
4. 改进API密钥未配置时的提示信息
5. 重构volcano TTS调用,新增voice参数支持
6. 优化请求体过大错误处理
7. 完善统计服务,修复环形缓冲区遍历逻辑,新增去重错误日志功能
This commit is contained in:
sun
2026-06-26 19:12:50 +08:00
parent 3d50b6c69d
commit 61431e00ba
9 changed files with 161 additions and 82 deletions
+2 -1
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@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ func InitAPIKeys() {
}
log.Printf("宸查厤缃?%d 涓湁鏁堢殑API瀵嗛挜", len(validAPIKeys))
} else {
log.Println("警告: OPENAI_TTS_API_KEY环境变量未设置,将拒绝所有请求?)
log.Println("警告: OPENAI_TTS_API_KEY环境变量未设置,所有请求将无需认证即可访问")
log.Println("如需启用API密钥验证,请设置 OPENAI_TTS_API_KEY 环境变量(多个密钥用逗号分隔)")
}
}
+36 -26
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@@ -79,35 +79,45 @@ func matchOrigin(origin string) (string, bool) {
func CORS(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
isPreflight := r.Method == http.MethodOptions
if origin != "" {
allowOrigin, matched := matchOrigin(origin)
if matched {
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", allowOrigin)
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, OPTIONS")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "X-Request-Id")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", corsMaxAgeHeader)
if allowOrigin != "*" {
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
}
vary := w.Header().Get("Vary")
if vary == "" {
w.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
} else if !strings.Contains(vary, "Origin") {
w.Header().Set("Vary", vary+", Origin")
}
} else {
log.Printf("CORS拦截: 来源=%q 路径=%s 方法=%s 客户端=%s",
origin, r.URL.Path, r.Method, GetClientIP(r))
if isPreflight {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
}
// 无 Origin 头:非跨域请求,跳过 CORS 处理
if origin == "" {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// 有 Origin 头时,响应必须携带 Vary: Origin 防止 CDN 缓存污染
vary := w.Header().Get("Vary")
if vary == "" {
w.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
} else if !strings.Contains(vary, "Origin") {
w.Header().Set("Vary", vary+", Origin")
}
isPreflight := r.Method == http.MethodOptions
allowOrigin, matched := matchOrigin(origin)
if !matched {
// Origin 不在白名单:拒绝请求(预检和非预检均拒绝),
// 防止不匹配的请求穿透到后端浪费 TTS 资源
log.Printf("CORS拦截: 来源=%q 路径=%s 方法=%s 客户端=%s",
origin, r.URL.Path, r.Method, GetClientIP(r))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// Origin 匹配:设置 CORS 响应头
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", allowOrigin)
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, OPTIONS")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "X-Request-Id")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", corsMaxAgeHeader)
if allowOrigin != "*" {
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
}
// 预检请求:直接返回 204,不进入内层中间件链,
// 避免消耗速率限制配额和并发槽位
if isPreflight {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
-7
View File
@@ -18,13 +18,6 @@ func (rec *statusRecorder) WriteHeader(code int) {
func Logger(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/health" {
start := time.Now()
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
log.Printf("%s %s %s %v", r.Method, r.RequestURI, r.RemoteAddr, time.Since(start))
return
}
start := time.Now()
rec := &statusRecorder{ResponseWriter: w, statusCode: http.StatusOK}
next.ServeHTTP(rec, r)
+53 -16
View File
@@ -90,26 +90,63 @@ func (rl *RateLimiter) cleanup() {
}
}
// 私有网络 CIDR 范围:仅在直连来源属于这些范围时才信任代理头
var privateCIDRs []*net.IPNet
func init() {
for _, cidr := range []string{
"10.0.0.0/8",
"172.16.0.0/12",
"192.168.0.0/16",
"127.0.0.0/8",
"169.254.0.0/16",
"::1/128",
"fc00::/7",
"fe80::/10",
} {
_, ipNet, _ := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
privateCIDRs = append(privateCIDRs, ipNet)
}
}
func isPrivateIP(ipStr string) bool {
ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
if ip == nil {
return false
}
if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
return true
}
for _, cidr := range privateCIDRs {
if cidr.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// GetClientIP 提取客户端真实 IP。
// 仅当直连来源为私有网络(本地代理、Docker 网桥等)时才信任 X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP,
// 防止公网直连场景下攻击者伪造代理头绕过速率限制。
func GetClientIP(r *http.Request) string {
xForwardedFor := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
if xForwardedFor != "" {
ips := strings.Split(xForwardedFor, ",")
if len(ips) > 0 {
ip := strings.TrimSpace(ips[0])
if ip != "" {
directIP, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
directIP = r.RemoteAddr
}
if isPrivateIP(directIP) {
if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
ip := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(xff, ",")[0])
if net.ParseIP(ip) != nil {
return ip
}
}
if xri := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP")); xri != "" {
if net.ParseIP(xri) != nil {
return xri
}
}
}
xRealIP := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"))
if xRealIP != "" {
return xRealIP
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return r.RemoteAddr
}
return host
return directIP
}